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Antitrust Jurisdiction and Remedies in an
Electric Utility Price Squeeze
Vertically integrated utilities frequently sell wholesale electric-
ity to municipally owned utilities or rural electric cooperatives that
resell the electricity in local markets.' These smaller utilities often
compete with the vertically integrated utility for retail customers.
If the larger utility charges a wholesale price so high that the
smaller utilities cannot buy and distribute power at a retail price
competitive with the retail price charged by the larger utility, a
"price squeeze" occurs. A wholesale rate creating a price squeeze
may violate federal law in two ways: it may be a monopolistic prac-
tice in violation of the antitrust laws, and it may be an "unreason-
able" rate prohibited by the Federal Power Act.2 A retailer injured
by a price squeeze thus may seek relief from the wholesale rate
before two different decisionmakers: a federal district court, which
is the arbiter of antitrust disputes, or the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC),3 which is the agency charged with en-
forcing the Federal Power Act.
The relationship between federal district courts and the FERC
is unsettled in price-squeeze cases. In order to eliminate a price
squeeze in an antitrust suit, a court may have to become involved
in the process of setting wholesale rates by requiring a defendant
utility either to file a lower wholesale rate with the FERC or to
refrain from charging a filed rate. In so doing a court may interfere
with Congress's explicit delegation of control over wholesale rates
to the FERC. Recognizing this problem, courts have disagreed
I The electric power industry comprises three distinct functions: the generation of
power, the wholesale transmission of "bulk" power at very high voltages, and the retail dis-
tribution of power to consumers at lower voltages. When one firm, typically investor-owned,
performs all three functions it is said to be vertically integrated. See generally Meeks, Con-
centration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLuM. L.
REV. 64, 67-69 (1972).
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982). For a discussion of the price squeeze as a monopolistic
practice, see infra notes 35-51.
' On October 1, 1977, the President, acting pursuant to the Department of Energy Or-
ganization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977), and Exec. Order No. 12,009, 3 C.F.R.
142 (1978), dissolved the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and transferred its functions to
the Secretary of Energy and the FERC. This comment will use each designation as
appropriate.
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about the extent to which their jurisdiction and remedial powers in
antitrust cases are limited when judicial action might interfere
with or contradict FERC policies or decisions. The problem facing
the courts is to determine what they should do when faced with an
antitrust case involving allegations of a price squeeze. In particu-
lar, what issues should the courts hear? When should they defer to
the FERC? What remedies should the courts order?
This comment argues that a district court hearing an antitrust
case involving allegations of a price squeeze should avail itself of
the FERC's expertise by invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion to refer to the FERC the factual issue of the existence of a
discriminatory price squeeze. The FERC's findings on this issue,
unless unsupported by substantial evidence, should then be bind-
ing on the court hearing the antitrust claim. The court should not,
however, be bound by the FERC's determinations of what consti-
tutes a reasonable or confiscatory wholesale rate, since the court's
deliberations on these issues necessarily differ from the FERC's
analysis under the Federal Power Act.
Part I of this comment presents an overview of the electric
power industry and the price-squeeze problem. Part II examines
the different substantive considerations that could lead a court and
the FERC to reach different conclusions about the proper whole-
sale rate in a price-squeeze case. Part III surveys the confusion of
doctrines by which the courts have attempted to resolve the co-
nundrum of dual jurisdiction and remedies. Part IV suggests a res-
olution of the issue.
I. PRICE SQUEEZES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
Although the electric power industry is often referred to as a
classic example of a "natural monopoly,"'4 this characterization can
be misleading. Because of economies of scale, a single large firm is
often the efficiency-maximizer for the generation and wholesale
transmission of electricity in a given market. A firm's average cost
of generating and transmitting electricity can decrease to a very
low level with large generators and increased transmission.5 In con-
' A natural monopoly is characterized by decreasing average total costs as output in-
creases, throughout the range of viable output levels. 2 ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 119 (1971).
The generation of electricity is said to be a natural monopoly because the high initial
fixed costs of electricity production can result in a lower average unit cost of service when
one firm supplies service in a particular area. See CHARLES PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES 42 (1984). The economies of scale for the transmission of electricity, how-
ever, are a function not of the increased size of the system, but of the density of load on the
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trast, the retail distribution of electricity within that same market
is often done by a number of smaller utilities. Since the efficiencies
of wholesale distribution are primarily the result of large-scale gen-
eration and transmission, smaller firms can compete in the local-
ized distribution of retail power once the electricity has been trans-
mitted to the region by a wholesale utility." A substantial number
of municipally owned utilities (municipals) and rural cooperatives7
thus compete with vertically integrated utilities in local markets
for the retail distribution of electricity they have purchased at
wholesale from the vertically integrated utilities.'
This structure of limited retail competition and wholesale mo-
nopoly can give rise to a price squeeze.9 Vertically integrated utili-
transmission line. Doubling the voltage increases the carrying capacity by the square of the
voltage change, while cost increases only in proportion to the change in voltage. Weiss, Anti-
trust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS
144-46 & n.19 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
' The distribution of electricity in an area may still be characterized as a natural mo-
nopoly, since a single distribution line is usually able to supply all of the energy demanded
at a lower average cost per unit than two or more lines. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price
Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of Action, 31 UCLA L. REv. 563, 568 (1984). Because the
voltage is decreased, however, the economies are also reduced. "Franchise" competition can
nevertheless take place for the right to supply the transmission line to the area. Competition
at the retail level can also occur through "individual load" competition, where firms com-
pete for new industrial and commercial users within their service territories; "fringe area"
competition, which takes place along the mutual borders of firms' service territories; and
"yardstick" competition, where service and rate comparisons between utilities serve as an
indirect form of competition. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 5, at 548.
7 As of 1982, state, municipal, and cooperative systems accounted for 14% of the indus-
try's total distribution capacity. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEAR3OOK OF THE
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY/1982, at 8. The cooperative-owned share is growing more rapidly
than any other. See Pace & Landon, Introducing Competition Into the Electric Utility
Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 1, 9-10 (1982).
8 The vertically integrated utilities are required to supply these retail competitors with
wholesale power. Failure to provide wholesale power could be a refusal to deal in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973).
9 See, e.g., FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1976); City of Kirkwood v.
Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1176 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); City
of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763,
765-66 (D. Del. 1979); Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp.
1343, 1346 (W.D. Pa. 1979). In economic terms a price squeeze occurs when the ratio of a
vertically integrated utility's wholesale price (Pw) to its marginal cost of wholesale service
(MCw) exceeds the ratio of its retail price (Pr) to its marginal cost of retail service (MCr):
Pw/MCw > Pr/MCr.
Lopatka, supra note 6, at 588.
The economic definition views a price squeeze as a form of price discrimination: the
prices charged by the vertically integrated utility discriminate in favor of its retail custom-
ers (and itself) and against wholesale customers. This kind of discrimination may or may
not eliminate efficient retail competitors; a retail competitor may distribute electricity so
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ties that supply wholesale power to municipals and rural coopera-
tives have an incentive to keep their wholesale rates high relative
to retail rates. This allows the utility to charge retail rates lower
than those of the municipal or rural cooperative, putting the local
retail distributor at a competitive disadvantage.
To illustrate the price squeeze, assume that A is a municipal
utility that purchases its wholesale power from B, a vertically inte-
grated utility that is the only wholesaler within A's service area. A
sells and distributes this power at retail to industrial, commercial,
and residential customers within its corporate limits. B may raise
its wholesale prices even if its marginal costs of producing whole-
sale electricity have not changed. A price squeeze can occur if B
does not raise the retail rates it charges its own customers. This
will result in an increase in the marginal retail costs of electricity
for A but not for B. The effect of such a price squeeze on
municipals and rural cooperatives can be dramatic. It can impair
A's ability to compete with B for retail and industrial customers
and increase pressure on the municipality operating A to sell or
lease A to B.
A price squeeze can also occur without the wholesaler con-
sciously intending to squeeze out its competition at the retail level.
Dual federal and state regulatory authority over rates may create a
differential in wholesale and retail rates. Retail rates of investor-
owned utilities are within the jurisdiction of state utility commis-
sions, 10 while wholesale rates of energy sold in interstate commerce
efficiently that its marginal cost of retail distribution added to the wholesale price it pays
still yields a lower retail price than that of the vertically integrated utility. The economic
definition identifies those pricing practices of vertically integrated utilities that place retail
competitors at a competitive disadvantage regardless of whether the disadvantage is fatal to
the municipal utility. Lopatka, supra note 6, at 588-89.
A meaningful definition of a price squeeze must take the wholesale utility's costs into
account, otherwise it would include "squeeze" situations that are beyond the control of the
utility. For example, the vertically integrated utility might be so much more efficient at
distribution than the municipal utility that its retail price is lower than the municipal's
costs even when the wholesale rate is no higher than the utility's costs.
Courts do not always define a price squeeze in economic terms; they are often content
to find a price squeeze simply when "wholesale rates [are] so high that [the utility's] whole-
sale customers will be unable to compete with it in the retail market." City of Kirkwood,
671 F.2d at 1176 n.4. Nor do the FERC's regulations list imbalanced price-cost ratios in the
wholesale or retail markets as an element of the prima facie case in a price-squeeze action.
See infra note 21.
10 Lopatka, supra note 6, at 568 & n.28. Rates charged by municipally owned utilities
generally are not subject to state regulation. Id. at 568 & n.29. For a discussion of state
regulation of utilities, see generally 1 A. J. G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULA-
TION chs. 3-5, 7-8 (1969).
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are subject to the FERC's jurisdiction." The mechanics of this
dual regulatory system often result in an unintentional price
squeeze: wholesale rates filed with the FERC go into effect auto-
matically after five months, subject to possible refund;' 2 retail
rates filed with state agencies, however, usually go into effect only
after the completion of agency review and approval.'" Thus, in-
creases in wholesale rates typically go into effect faster than in-
creases in retail rates, creating a temporary price squeeze on re-
tailer utilities.
Moreover, even if there is no difference in the timing of rate
increases, the dual regulatory scheme can still create a price
squeeze. If the state agency and the FERC evaluate differently any
of the factors in the rate determination-for example, size of rate
base, equitable rate of return, or operating expenses-the relative
rates they will allow the utility to charge will differ. 14 Thus, both
the timing of the regulatory decisions and the rate-setting process
at the state and federal levels make a price squeeze possible re-
gardless of the intentions of the vertically integrated utility.15
II. THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES
The limited competition in the electric power industry brings
its operation within the reach of two distinct control mechanisms:
direct agency regulation and judicial antitrust scrutiny. Regulation
has been the traditional response to natural monopolies.'" How-
11 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824d (1982).
12 Proposed rates must be filed with the FERC at least 60 days before they are to go
into effect. The FERC may suspend the operation of a new rate for up to five months be-
yond the 60 days in order to hold a hearing on its legality. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1982).
"2 Most state statutes require final action on the proposed rate within one year of filing.
See Lopatka, supra note 6, at 587.
14 See id. at 595-97. Thus, if the FERC allows a wholesale increase of 10 per kilowatt-
hour and the state agency only increases the retail price by 5t per kilowatt-hour, 50 of the
municipal's competitive margin will be eliminated by the wholesale increase. If the whole-
saler's marginal costs of production and its retail price have not risen along with its whole-
sale rate, the retailer's rates may become uncompetitive, resulting in a price squeeze.
" The price-squeeze problem would not disappear with a unified regulatory scheme.
Since some rate differentials between wholesale and retail rates must continue to exist in
order to allow the wholesaler a margin of profit, the regulatory body would still have to
make the difficult determination of whether a rate differential constituted price discrimina-
tion. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
,$ See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 15 (1982). In certain industries,
economies of scale make it efficient for the government to grant one or more firms monopoly
power subject to regulation of prices and profits. These industries include natural gas pipe-
lines, electricity distribution, waterworks, and local telephone systems. Even when adminis-
tered well, however, rate regulation cannot ensure that rates will be identical to those in a
competitive market. See Hjelmfelt, Retail Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 60
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ever, because limited competition can exist in a given market for
the retail distribution of power, courts have applied the antitrust
laws to protect retail distributors against abuse of the wholesale
utility's natural monopoly power.17 The different substantive and
procedural frameworks used in this dual jurisdictional scheme re-
sult in tension when one approach conflicts with the other.'8
A. The Regulatory Response to Price Squeezes
The Federal Power Act gives the FERC authority to set
wholesale rates for electric power. Although the FERC does not
review every proposed schedule of wholesale rates, it can review
the lawfulness of proposed rates upon its own motion or upon com-
plaint. 9 If the FERC concludes that any rate or practice is "un-
DEN. L.J. 1, 4 (1982).
See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 756-62 (1973).
38 There is no fundamental tension, however, between natural monopoly theory and the
goals of antitrust law. The antitrust laws are not designed to promote competition simply
because competition is thought to be of value in and of itself, regardless of the cost. Al-
though the principles behind the antitrust laws are sometimes stated in such broad terms,
see, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966) (Sherman Act passed
"to prevent further concentration and to preserve competition among a large number of
sellers"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (one of
the purposes of the Sherman Act is "to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively com-
pete with each other"), a better interpretation is that the antitrust laws promote competi-
tion because of its allocative efficiency: competition pressures producers to lower prices and
increase quality. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADox 66 (1978); cf. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984) (Sherman Act "especially intended"
to serve consumer interests). The existence of a natural monopoly is not inconsistent with
antitrust law since it means that economies of scale are such that a single producer or sup-
plier can serve a given market at the lowest average cost. Thus, natural monopolies may also
serve allocative efficiency.
A tension between antitrust and regulation exists, however, in their responses to poten-
tial abuse by the natural monopolist. The natural monopolist has an incentive to limit sup-
ply in order to achieve monopoly pricing and maximize profits. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 253 (2d ed. 1977). The antitrust laws combat this by protecting limited
competition-such as competition among franchises to serve a given market at the wholesale
level-in order to pressure the natural monopolist to lower rates and give higher quality
service. The regulatory model, on the other hand, seeks to prevent abuse of the natural
monopoly by directly controlling market entry, the range of services offered, rates of return,
and retail rate structures. Any tension in the utility context therefore results from the dif-
ferent approaches towards achieving a common goal: "antitrust laws seek to create or main-
tain the conditions of a competitive marketplace" while regulation attempts to "replicate
the results of competition." S. BREYER, supra note 16, at 156-57 (emphasis in original).
'9 Under the Act, a proposed rate can be challenged before the FERC as being "unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential," and the FERC can set the "just and
reasonable rate." 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1982). The relevant part of the statute reads as
follows:
(a) Just and reasonable rates. All rates and charges made, demanded or received by any
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just, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential," it deter-
mines and enforces the "just and reasonable rate. '20  The
proceedings before the FERC are wholly independent of any anti-
trust action based on the utility's wholesale rate structure.
The FERC's analysis of a price-squeeze allegation involves
three steps.21 First, the FERC must determine whether price dis-
crimination exists. Then it must evaluate whether the discrimina-
tion is undue in light of countervailing considerations of public
policy. Finally, if the discrimination is judged to be undue, the
FERC must set a reasonable rate.
Identification of price discrimination by the FERC turns on
whether the utility's filed rate equals the utility's revenue require-
ments.22 To evaluate the filed rate, the FERC must first make
three determinations: a preliminary finding of the defendant's cap-
ital costs-its gross revenues minus its estimated current operating
expenses; an evaluation of the rate base-the value of the facilities
used to provide electrical services; and a final calculation of the
rate of return to be applied to the rate base, to establish the return
to be given investors.23 These findings are used to determine the
revenue requirement of the utility. The FERC designs a rate struc-
ture to meet this requirement, taking into account the utility's cost
of service. 4 If the wholesale rates exceed the retail rates, and the
public utility... shall be just and reasonable and any such rate or charge that is not
just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.(b) Preference or advantage un-
lawful. No public utility shall. . . (1) make or grant any undue preference or advan-
tage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2)
maintain any unreasonable difference in rates . . . either as between localities or as
between classes of service.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b) (1982).
In addition, regulations issued by the FERC allow "[a]ny wholesale customer, state
commission or other interested person" to "file petitions to intervene alleging price discrimi-
nation and anticompetitive effects of the wholesale rates." 18 C.F.R. § 2.17(a) (1985).
20 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1982).
2 The FERC has ruled that a prima facie case of a price squeeze must be established
before it will consider a price-squeeze allegation in a rate proceeding. 18 C.F.R. § 2.17(a)
(1985). Elements of a prima facie price-squeeze case include: (1) specification of the retail
rate deemed prohibitive; (2) a showing that retail competition exists; (3) a showing that
retail rates are lower than the proposed wholesale rates for comparable service; (4) the
wholesale customer's retail rate for comparable service; and (5) the reduction in the whole-
sale rate necessary to remedy the price squeeze. Id. § 2.17(a)(1)-(5).
22 The equation of rates and revenue requirements is a basic principle in electric utility
rate regulation. See S. BREYER, supra note 16, at 36-37; 1 A. KAHN, supra note 4, ch. 2; 1 A.
PRIEST, supra note 10, at 191-93.
23 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 45-46.
24 Cost-of-service determinations are extremely complex and technical. One commenta-
tor noted that such determinations "can be difficult for professional rate engineers, let alone
federal judges with no technical expertise." Lopatka, supra note 6, at 600 n.189 (citation
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disparity is not explained by differences in costs, the FERC con-
cludes that discrimination exists.25
A finding of price discrimination does not by itself mean that
a rate is unjust or unreasonable. The FERC must also determine if
the price is "unduly" discriminatory in light of public policy and
the "broad purposes" of the Federal Power Act.26 The FERC's
principal statutory directive is to assure an abundant supply of en-
ergy throughout the country with the greatest possible economy
and conservation. Other factors taken into account by the FERC
include adequacy of service, reliability, financial integrity, length
of time and extent of price discrimination, and the regulatory ac-
tions of state commissions. 28 In light of these countervailing policy
considerations the FERC may decide that the discrimination re-
sulting from a price squeeze is not undue and hence not in viola-
tion of the Act.29
omitted). The cost-of-service determination includes four cost categories: customer, demand,
energy, and capacity. Customer costs, such as accounting, billing, and metering, vary with
the number of customers served. Demand costs, which include actual production and trans-
mission costs, vary with the amount of demand placed on the system. Energy costs, such as
fuel, labor, and plant maintenance, vary with the amount of kilowatt-hours supplied. Capac-
ity costs, such as the rate of return on the rate base, taxes, and interest charges, are "joint
costs" which cannot be traced to particular customers. Id. at 578-81.
Once these costs are established, they are assigned to a customer classification, such as
residential, commercial, or industrial, in order to determine the relevant cost of service for
each customer group. The assignment of customer, demand, and energy costs is on a causal
basis-it is clear at the margin how service to each customer class affects each kind of cost.
Because capacity costs are not allocable on a causal basis to a customer class, formulae for
making such allocations must be developed. Id. at 577-79.
2" See, e.g., In re Missouri Power & Light Co., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 365, 370-71 & n.18
(1978); cf. In re Boston Edison Co., 30 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 477, 493 (1979) (absence of
evidence about comparability of retail and wholesale costs in relation to rates precludes
finding of price discrimination). The presence or absence of an intent to discriminate is
irrelevant in determining whether price discrimination exists. See Missouri Power, 26 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th at 370-71 & n.17.
28 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (1982) (quoted in relevant part supra note 19); see Gulf States
Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 759-60 (1973).
2 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1982).
2" See, e.g., In re Missouri Power & Light Co., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 365, 371-72
(1978).
" In FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the FERC
is required to consider the possible anticompetitive effects of a price squeeze. This consider-
ation is not, however, of greater importance than other policy considerations underlying the
Federal Power Act. Conway simply requires the FERC to consider price-squeeze effects in
its deliberations. Kansas Cities v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The FERC has
summarized its analysis in the following manner: "The commission does not enforce the
antitrust laws. In carrying out its responsibility to set just and reasonable rates for public
utilities, the commission must determine what is in the public interest. Such a determina-
tion may involve considerations which outweigh the anticompetitive effect of a particular
filing." In re Missouri Power & Light Co., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 365, 371 (1978) (footnote
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Even if the FERC concludes that a wholesale rate creates un-
due discrimination, statutory and constitutional limits on the
FERC's power may prevent it from being able to order a rate low
enough to eliminate the price squeeze. Under the Federal Power
Act, the FERC cannot set what is, in its view, an "unreasonable"
rate.30 Underlying this statutory constraint is a constitutional
limit: if the FERC sets rates that do not allow the utility to earn a
reasonable return on its investment, the FERC deprives the utility
of its property without just compensation in violation of the fifth
amendment." Because of this constitutional limit the FERC may
not set the wholesale rate below the price at which, in light of the
cost-of-service evaluation, the wholesaler would receive a reasona-
ble return-even if that rate perpetuates a price squeeze. The
FERC is thus constrained to set rates within a "zone of reasonable-
ness." 3 The concept of a zone of reasonableness acknowledges that
there is a range of "reasonable" rates between a rate that is so low
as to be confiscatory33 and a rate that is discriminatory or which
allows the utility an unreasonably high return.34
As the preceding discussion shows, the FERC's remedial re-
sponse to an alleged price squeeze is limited. If the FERC deter-
mines that price discrimination exists, it can reject a wholesale rate
on price-squeeze grounds only if its discriminatory effect is undue
in light of countervailing policy considerations. Even if the FERC
determines that there is undue discrimination, it may be unable to
omitted).
30 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1982).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
32 FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942).
33 See, e.g., Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1938); Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1923); see also
Pond, Restraining Regulatory Activism: The Proper Scope of Public Utility Regulation, 35
AD. L. REV. 423, 427-28 (1983) ("while a commission may fix rates within a zone of reasona-
bleness, it may not impose upon a public utility confiscatory rates").
34 The zone of reasonableness does not have precise boundaries. See, e.g., Montana-
Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) ("[s]tatutory
reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint"). The
FERC must permit the utility to "earn a return on the value of [its] property ... equal to
that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and
uncertainties." Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 692 (1923); see also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)
("[TJhe return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in
other enterprises having corresponding risks.").
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eliminate the price squeeze completely if doing so would not assure
the wholesaler a reasonable return.
B. The Judicial Response to Price Squeezes: The Antitrust
Action
The antitrust laws make it a felony to monopolize or attempt
to monopolize a market in interstate commerce.2 To sustain an
allegation of monopolization the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant possessed monopoly power36 and intended to exercise that
power for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes.37 A charge of
attempted monopolization requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant had an intent to achieve monopoly power' and a "dan-
gerous probability" of succeeding.3
The antitrust laws have been held to apply to the electric
power industry.40 When an allegation of a price squeeze is made
-- 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States. . .shall be deemed guilty of a felony. .. ").
36 Monopoly power is defined as "the power to control prices or exclude competition"
within a relevant market. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
3' See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1983).
" See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1948); United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948).
3, See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
40 See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976); Gulf States Utils. Co.
v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
372-75 (1973). For example, in Otter Tail an electric utility was alleged to have attempted
to monopolize the retail distribution of electric power in its service area. The utility argued
that judicial antitrust review was precluded because the FPC had the authority to compel
involuntary interconnections of power. 410 U.S. at 373. The Supreme Court, however, held
that "[t]here is nothing in the legislative history [of the Federal Power Act] which reveals a
purpose to insulate electric power companies from the operation of the antitrust laws." Id.
at 373-74.
There is some question, however, whether the antitrust laws are applicable to all cases
involving a power industry price squeeze. Two antitrust doctrines in particular may affect a
district court's antitrust jurisdiction in price-squeeze cases. First, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, which grew out of Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965),
provides that a concerted effort to influence public officials is a right of petition protected
from the antitrust laws by the first amendment. Defendants in price-squeeze cases have
argued that the filing of wholesale rates represents such a petition protected by Noerr-Pen-
nington. See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 981 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). The Supreme Court has stated, however, that
"nothing in the Noerr opinion implies that the mere fact that a state regulatory agency may
approve a proposal included in a tariff . . . is a sufficient reason for conferring antitrust
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under the antitrust laws,41 the plaintiff usually asserts that the
wholesale utility has monopolized or attempted to monopolize the
retail electric power market by increasing wholesale rates so that
they impede the retail distributor's ability to compete effectively.42
As the vertically integrated utility is often found to possess mo-
nopoly power over wholesale or retail electricity sales within the
relevant market of its service area due to a typically large market
immunity on the proposed conduct." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601-02
(1976); see also Lopatka, supra note 6, at 633-35 (arguing that the Noerr-Pennington ex-
emption should never apply in the price-squeeze context). In California Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), moreover, the Supreme Court indicated that
first amendment rights do not provide antitrust immunity if the end result is to bar compet-
itors from access to the administrative or judicial processes. Id. at 515. Consequently, the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been held not to protect the defendant in a price-squeeze
case where the defendant's repetitive filing of increasingly higher wholesale rates precluded
the retailer from "fair and effective" access to the regulatory process. City of Mishawaka,
616 F.2d at 981-83. Even if it is possible that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine could exempt
some price-squeeze cases from antitrust scrutiny, Cantor and City of Mishawaka indicate
that many price-squeeze cases will fall outside the scope of that doctrine.
The second doctrine potentially applicable in the price-squeeze context is the state-
action exemption doctrine, established in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943),
which provides antitrust immunity for activity undertaken pursuant to a state economic
regulatory scheme. Arguably, the state's involvement in approving and enforcing retail rates
could bring a price-squeeze allegation within the ambit of this protection, particularly in
cases of a price squeeze caused by the dual regulatory structure, see supra notes 10-15 and
accompanying text. However, recent Supreme Court decisions have so limited the state-
action exemption that it appears inapplicable in a price-squeeze case. To be protected, an-
ticompetitive conduct must be undertaken by the state, not merely acquiesced in or ap-
proved by the state. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977). In Cantor, no state
exemption was found for a utility program of light bulb distribution, even though the state
would have to approve any change in the program. 428 U.S. at 582-83. Because the state's
role in a price-squeeze case is similarly limited to approval of rates filed by the utility, the
state-action exemption doctrine has been rejected in such cases. See City of Mishawaka, 616
F.2d at 985. Courts have also emphasized that federal control over wholesale rates limits a
state's ability to effectuate a price squeeze and thus limits the attribution of a price squeeze
to state action. See City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 766-
67 (D. Del. 1979); Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343,
1348-49 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
41 For examples of antitrust challenges to alleged price squeezes, see cases cited supra
note 9. One of the first examples of a price squeeze included in an antitrust action was
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1945). In contrast, it
was not until the Supreme Court's decision in FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279
(1976), that the FERC's power to consider allegations of a price squeeze in setting wholesale
rates was established.
42 Plaintiffs often allege other antitrust violations in addition to charges of monopoliza-
tion under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Electric Co., 671 F.2d
1173, 1176 (8th Cir. 1982) (alleging territorial restriction and refusal to set a transmission
rate for a municipal utility), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); City of Newark v. Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 765 (D. Del. 1979) (alleging that the utility substan-
tially lessened competition in violation of Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982)).
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share,43 the critical element in a price-squeeze action is usually
* proof of the requisite intent to eliminate competition.44
Courts sometimes infer anticompetitive intent merely from the
existence of price differentials or a disparity between wholesale
and retail ratios of prices to costs. 45 The greater the price differen-
tials, the more likely it is that the defendant intended a price
squeeze. However, because of the complexity of the cost-of-service
analysis used to determine whether a rate is discriminatory, courts
may lack the expertise needed to judge the defendant's conduct or
intent accurately. Moreover, the prevalence of regulation tends to
diminish the likelihood that willful intent to monopolize is the
cause of a price squeeze.46 Since price differentials may be an unin-
tended result of the two-tier regulatory system, courts often do not
rely exclusively on anticompetitive effects to infer intent.41 Thus,
although general intent has traditionally been a sufficient basis for
a finding of monopolization,48 courts have required more than a
general intent to monopolize in a price-squeeze case.
Once the elements necessary to constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws are established, a court, unlike the FERC, need not
further determine whether the antitrust violation is "undue." The
43 See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1325-26
(N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096
(1981).
44 See, e.g., City of Batavia v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 76-C-4388 (N.D. Ill. Jan
16, 1984) (available Nov. 20, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (the issue of intent
to monopolize is dispositive of the price-squeeze claim).
45 See City of Shakopee v. Northern States Power Co., No. 4-75-591, slip op. at 2 (D.
Minn. Oct. 18, 1976); cf. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320,
1334-37 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (specific intent may be inferred from the defendant's maintenance
of a price squeeze and attempts to discontinue wholesale sales to plaintiff), aff'd in part, 616
F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). But see, e.g., Bonjorno v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1984) (price differentials do not
establish monopolization without "evidence that the defendants deliberately produced the
effect").
" See Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343, 354-55 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980); see also City of Groton v. Connecticut Light &
Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1981); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power
Co., 616 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); City of Batavia v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 76-C-4388 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 1984) (available Nov. 20, 1985,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
47 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; see also City of Newark v. Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D. Del. 1979) (defendant argued that differential
rate was unintentional); cf. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976,
988 n.16 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Anticompetitive effects from this portion of the price squeeze,
absent evidence that the utility deliberately depressed its retail rates, must be attributed to
the state regulatory commissions and not to the utility."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
4" See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948) ("Specific intent ... is
necessary only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the [Sherman] Act.").
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antitrust laws do not authorize the courts to take into account
countervailing policy considerations in determining whether a vio-
lation has occurred; unlike the Federal Power Act, the only policy
embodied by the Sherman Act is one of ensuring vigorous competi-
tion.4 9 Furthermore, if the court finds an antitrust violation, it is
not constrained to setting a rate within the "zone of reasonable-
ness"; in general, a court may order relief which "represents a rea-
sonable method of eliminating the consequences of the illegal con-
duct, ' 50 even if that relief may harm or adversely affect the party
whose conduct is being regulated. 1
C. The Jurisdictional Conflict
The preceding discussion indicates three fundamental differ-
ences between the regulatory and judicial responses to a price
squeeze. First, the FERC determines whether a price squeeze is
unlawful according to substantive legal standards unlike those em-
ployed by an antitrust court. For the FERC, a wholesale rate is
reasonable if it is justified by the utility's revenue requirements.
Even if the rate discriminates against retailer utilities, the FERC
may still approve it in light of countervailing considerations of
public policy. In contrast, the antitrust inquiry concentrates on in-
tent-if the utility had monopoly power and intended to use it by
setting wholesale rates in such a way as to injure its retail competi-
tors, the rate is illegal. The utility's revenue requirements are rele-
vant to but not determinative of the existence of anticompetitive
intent, and countervailing policy considerations might not be rele-
49 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978) ("Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition,
the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad."). But cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963) (statutory
scheme of the Securities Exchange Act does not immunize exchange rules from antitrust
laws; its acknowledgment of the value of exchange rules that restrict entry must be in-
termeshed with the goals of the Sherman Act); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1979) (legally acquired monopolies which do not exercise their
power to increase their control of the market do not violate the Sherman Act), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Even though some monopoly power may be approved, courts do not
do so from policy considerations; rather they do so because the monopoly has been achieved
in compliance with the antitrust laws.
"o National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978).
" See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961)
(courts are "required[] to decree relief effective to redress the violations, whatever the ad-
verse effect. . . on private interests"); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131, 159 (1948) ("the policy of the antitrust laws is not. . . conditioned by the convenience
of those whose conduct is regulated).
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vant at all.52
Second, even if the FERC and an antitrust court agree that a
wholesale rate is illegal, each has different powers to remedy the
offensive rate. Both the FERC and an antitrust court have the
power to order a new wholesale rate, but the FERC can only order
rates within the "zone of reasonableness." A court may go below
that range. And an antitrust court, unlike the FERC, is empowered
to award damages to the victims of a price squeeze.
Finally, institutional differences between the FERC and a fed-
eral district court may lead to an important functional difference
in their approaches to a price squeeze. The identification of a price
squeeze is made difficult by the complexity of rate regulation, es-
pecially in ascertaining the defendant's costs of producing whole-
sale electricity. 53 The FERC's experience in rate setting generally
makes its determination of costs more accurate than that of the
district court hearing the antitrust case.
These differences between the FERC's and the courts' sub-
stantive, remedial, and functional powers suggest that the ultimate
legality of any given wholesale rate may depend upon whether the
case is heard by the FERC or the courts. 4 When a retail utility
seeks to challenge a wholesale rate proposed by a vertically inte-
grated utility as giving rise to a price squeeze, it will have the
choice of proceeding before the FERC in the rate-approval process,
before the district court in a suit alleging antitrust violations, or in
both forums. And because of the above-mentioned differences be-
tween the courts' and the FERC's powers, the outcome of the anti-
trust proceeding may conflict with the outcome of past, present, or
future proceedings before the FERC, and vice versa. This potential
for conflicting outcomes thus requires that courts formulate a con-
sistent approach to the problem of the dual jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts and the FERC over price-squeeze cases.
52 In light of these different considerations in the FERC's analysis, one court has held
that the FERC's determination of a price-squeeze challenge was not res judicata in the
court's determination of the antitrust action because "the ultimate issues before FERC were
not identical to the ultimate issues here." Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
517 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
13 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
U The jurisdictional conflict between the FERC and the district court has arisen in
only one case before the Supreme Court: Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973). However, the Court declined to resolve the conflict because an FPC order requir-
ing long-term interconnection by the utility was entered shortly after the district court is-
sued its decree enjoining the utility from refusing to sell electric power at wholesale to mu-
nicipal utilities within its service area. Id. at 375-77. This action avoided any conflict
between the courts and the FERC.
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III. CURRENT JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO DuAL JURISDICTION
Recent judicial responses to dual jurisdiction in price-squeeze
cases alleging federal antitrust violations have varied signifi-
cantly.5 5 Courts have differed primarily in two main areas: if and
when a court should allow the FERC primary jurisdiction in a
price-squeeze case, and the extent to which the existence of the
FERC alters a court's remedial powers. Several courts have in-
voked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and remanded the anti-
trust dispute to the FERC for an initial determination of the valid-
ity of the challenged rate. 6 Other courts have decided that the
FERC can contribute nothing to an antitrust action and have
claimed complete control over the dispute.57 Several courts have
also determined that regardless of which forum has jurisdiction
over a price squeeze, the FERC's authority over wholesale rates
and its limited ability to remedy price squeezes place substantive
limitations on the remedial powers of an antitrust court.58 These
different responses are discussed in detail in this section.
A. Primary Jurisdiction in the Price Squeeze Context
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction regulates concurrent judi-
cial and administrative jurisdiction. 9 When invoked by a court,
the doctrine allows legal or factual issues that are justiciable before
both an administrative agency and a court to be referred to the
agency for prior consideration. The purposes of the doctrine are to
promote uniformity in regulatory programs and utilization of
agency expertise6 0 The doctrine must remain flexible in order to
5 See 16e JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWsKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION § 44A.01[1], at 44A-5 to -10 (1984).
56 See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
51 See generally 4 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 22:1-22:11 (2d
ed. 1983); 16e J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 55, §§ 44A.01[1], 44A.03[1]. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907). The Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission was the sole
agency "vested with power originally to entertain proceedings" to determine the reasonable-
ness of carrier rates. Id. at 448. Although Abilene Cotton was grounded in concern for na-
tionally uniform regulations, id. at 440-41, the primary jurisdiction doctrine was later ex-
panded in Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922), and United States
v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), to apply when administrative expertise was
required.
60 The agency expertise rationale recognizes that an administrative body's special com-
petence can be of use to a court. Under this rationale, primary jurisdiction should be in-
voked where "the limited functions of review by the judiciary [would be] more rationally
exercised by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underly-
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attain these goals; one consequence of this flexibility, however, is
that the guidelines for applying the doctrine are not clearly
delineated.
Primary jurisdiction does not assign final jurisdiction between
courts and agencies, but is used only to set an appropriate time for
judicial consideration. A court that invokes primary jurisdiction
does not necessarily refrain from deciding the case before it; it may
only be postponing its action on the case until after the agency has
made a determination."1 Thus, a court's exercise of primary juris-
diction in a price-squeeze case may delay its consideration of a
case, but it does not divest the court of its jurisdiction-the court
retains control over the resolution of the dispute. The agency's ac-
tion, however, can greatly simplify or render unnecessary further
judicial action.
The district courts that have invoked the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in price-squeeze cases have done so principally to take
advantage of the FERC's institutional expertise in determining
certain factual issues.6 2 For example, one court which invoked pri-
mary jurisdiction stated that review of the utility's cost structure
was "well within the experience of the FERC and beyond the nor-
mal expertise of the court."6 It also noted that the FERC's deter-
mination of the reasonableness of the challenged rate would aid
the court in its determination of anticompetitive intent.6 4 In addi-
tion, the court reasoned that the use of primary jurisdiction would
avoid a needless duplication of effort.65
Some courts, however, have held that the primary jurisdiction
doctrine should not be applied in price-squeeze cases. In City of
ing legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight
gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure." Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952); see also Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289,
307 (1973) (primary jurisdiction should be invoked when a "specialized agency" will make
"determination[s] of fact" that "will be of great help to the antitrust court").
11 See 16e J. VON KnINOWSKI, supra note 55, § 44A.01[1], at 44A-10; KENNETH C. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 19.01, at 373 (3d ed. 1972); Fox, The Antitrust Laws and Reg-
ulated Industries: A Reappraisal of the Role of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 2 MEM.
ST. U.L. REV. 279, 295-96 (1972).
62 See, e.g., Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343,
1350-52 (W.D. Pa. 1979); cf. City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp.
763, 772 (D. Del. 1979) (acknowledging that primary jurisdiction would be advisable, but
declining to invoke it at the time because the FPC had indicated that it would not investi-
gate a claim based on a price squeeze "too far back in history").
'3 Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (W.D.
Pa. 1979).
64 Id. at 1351.
" Id. at 1352.
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Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. (Mishawaka I),"
for example, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the primary ju-
risdiction doctrine because the court felt capable of determining
antitrust issues without the FERC's views on the reasonableness of
the defendant's rates. The court reasoned that the statutory con-
siderations unique to the FERC's determination of reasonableness
made the FERC's expertise irrelevant to the antitrust allegation.17
Moreover, because the FERC would never be able to provide full
relief for the plaintiff's antitrust claims, the court concluded that
invoking primary jurisdiction would be a futile method of estab-
lishing a uniform regulation of price squeezes.68 Because the court
believed primary jurisdiction would enhance neither expertise nor
uniformity, it retained complete jurisdiction over the dispute.
The jurisdictional overlap in price-squeeze cases thus presents
an opportunity to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. A
court is more likely to invoke primary jurisdiction when it con-
cludes that the FERC's expertise will help determine the merits of
the antitrust challenge and promote a uniform national regulatory
policy. However, courts have not exercised this option consistently
because they disagree about whether the traditional purposes of
primary jurisdiction apply in the price-squeeze context.
B. Remedial Powers of the District Courts
Courts also disagree about the proper scope of their remedial
powers in the price-squeeze context. Although the antitrust laws
give a federal district court broad injunctive powers to remedy an
antitrust violation,69 not all courts agree that these powers should
be exercised to their fullest extent in a price-squeeze case. Clearly,
after the exercise of primary jurisdiction an antitrust court's reme-
dial injunctive powers are less likely to be needed, since the FERC
may have ordered a wholesale rate that comports with antitrust
standards. In such a case, a court may be wary of ordering relief
which conflicts with the FERC's decision. But where the FERC's
order does not bring the rate within antitrust standards, or where
the antitrust laws would provide additional injunctive relief be-
yond the FERC's powers, there is less reason for a court to defer to
the FERC's judgment and refrain from ordering different or addi-
" 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
e' Id. at 1324.
88 Id. at 1323.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) provides that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief' for an antitrust violation.
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tional relief. Nevertheless, some courts have hesitated to wield
their full remedial powers in price-squeeze cases.70 In general,
courts have adopted four different approaches to the question of
what remedial powers they should exercise in light of the FERC's
parallel jurisdiction over price-squeeze cases.
First, because the Supreme Court has held that the Federal
Power Act does not preclude the operation of the antitrust laws,7 1
most courts considering price-squeeze allegations have assumed
that they may exercise their remedial powers broadly despite the
FERC's concurrent jurisdiction. They conclude that they have the
power to enjoin a defendant from charging a filed rate, order a de-
fendant to file a lower wholesale rate, or prohibit the filing of a
higher rate. 2 These courts have also rejected the argument that
the FERC's jurisdiction in price-squeeze cases is "exclusive." Utili-
ties charged with creating a price squeeze in violation of the anti-
trust laws have argued that the existence of the FERC's power
over wholesale rates completely divests a court of any power to
hear a price-squeeze allegation.73 The courts have reasoned, how-
70 See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 990 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981) (Mishawaka II); Mishawaka I, 560 F.2d at 1323-
24; City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 769 (D. Del. 1979).
71 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Mishawaka II, 616 F.2d at 990-92 & n.18 (allowing limited injunctive re-
lief); Mishawaka I, 560 F.2d at 1323 (court may order defendant to file a new wholesale rate
application).
73 This is an application of the doctrine of "exclusive jurisdiction." Exclusive jurisdic-
tion provides immunity from the antitrust laws when a pervasive regulatory scheme indi-
cates that Congress intended for the regulatory process to be the exclusive means of reme-
dying the problem to which the regulation is addressed. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York
Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975) (SEC-established stockbroker commissions); Hughes
Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363, 389 (1973) (aviation collective agreements
under the CAB); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922) (interstate carrier
rates under the ICC). Most courts have rejected the application of the doctrine to price-
squeeze cases because the FERC's limited remedial powers, see supra notes 26-34 and ac-
companying text, do not indicate congressional intent to exclude other means of regulation.
See, e.g., Mishawaka I, 560 F.2d at 1321; Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power
Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
Although exclusive jurisdiction is inappropriate in price-squeeze cases, the courts' ra-
tionale for rejecting it is not convincing. It equates pervasiveness of rate regulation with the
possession of remedial powers equal to those given by the antitrust laws. Indeed, the fact
that Congress extensively regulated an area but provided only limited remedies could argue
in favor of exclusive jurisdiction. Perhaps Congress intended to replace antitrust enforce-
ment with regulation precisely because antitrust remedies were too broad. City of Newark v.
Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D. Del. 1979).
A better criterion for determining the exclusivity of the FERC's jurisdiction is whether
the court's exercise of antitrust jurisdiction would disrupt the "work which Congress con-
templated the [FERC] would do." Id. at 769. The FERC operates primarily to assure an
effective and fair system of supplying wholesale power. This leaves the antitrust laws as the
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ever, that the FERC would completely preempt the court's juris-
diction only if their remedial powers were identical; because Con-
gress imposed limitations on the FERC's remedies that it did not
impose on antitrust courts, the FERC's jurisdiction is not exclu-
sive.74 By adopting this line of reasoning, these courts are expressly
claiming to possess power to order relief the FERC cannot-such
as the power to set a rate outside the zone of reasonableness. 75
In a second approach, a court's willingness to impose different
remedies from those ordered by the FERC depends upon the
court's reason for invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Some courts defer to an administrative agency's jurisdiction
merely as a "preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting
the circumstances underlying legal issues. 7 6 In an antitrust action,
this view of primary jurisdiction envisions the FERC's decision as
merely an expert advisory opinion that does not affect the court's
remedial powers.77 On the other hand, primary jurisdiction is also
primary mechanism of protecting against anticompetitive conduct. Accordingly, an antitrust
court's consideration of a price-squeeze allegation would not infringe directly on the FERC's
regulatory jurisdiction. This view recognizes that the FERC might find a rate to be reasona-
ble in light of countervailing policy considerations, but that a court, which does not make
such considerations, might still find that the antitrust laws have been violated. Because the
courts and the FERC are required to consider different factors in evaluating a price squeeze,
invoking the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the dual jurisdictional question is
inappropriate.
Another related approach is the filed-rate doctrine, formulated by the Supreme Court
in Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951). The
doctrine states that a plaintiff cannot "litigate in a judicial forum [his] general right to a
reasonable rate" when the determination of reasonableness has been given to an administra-
tive agency. Id. at 251. The fied-rate doctrine is also inapplicable in the price-squeeze con-
text. An antitrust challenge to a price squeeze does not involve a per se challenge to the
FERC's reasonableness determination; it is not an attempt to relitigate a rate-setting which
is committed to agency discretion. See City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173,
1179 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
74 See City of Kirkwood, 671 F.2d at 1178; Mishawaka I, 560 F.2d at 1321; Borough of
Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
75 See, e.g., City of Kirkwood, 671 F.2d at 1178.
76 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
7 See, e.g., Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962)
(judicial remedy survives the exercise of primary jurisdiction); United States v. Western
Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (primary jurisdiction suspends "a claim . . . originally
cognizable in the courts pending referral. . . to the administrative body for its views"); Fox,
supra note 61, at 295-96 (primary jurisdiction refers to the timing of judicial resolution,
rather than the court's power to consider a matter); Lopatka, supra note 6, at 607 (same);
cf. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 489 (1962) (administrative determination carries only
"momentum" into antitrust litigation); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1037,
1055 (1964) ("[J]urisdiction should be retained . . . if dismissal would prejudice one of the
parties.").
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thought by some to limit the court's power to impose remedies.7 8 If
the invocation of primary jurisdiction is characterized as a means
of achieving regulatory uniformity, the court should have only the
power to review the agency finding to determine whether it is sup-
ported by "substantial evidence. 1 7 9 Under this view, it would be
inconsistent with the goal of uniformity for the court to have the
power to consider additional remedies that the agency lacked stat-
utory authority to implement in the first place. In the price-
squeeze context, this approach would require that the court's anti-
trust remedial power not exceed the FERC's remedial power under
the Federal Power Act.
Third, even if the court does not invoke primary jurisdiction,
it might refrain from ordering certain kinds of relief for fear of
interfering with the FERC's control over rates. In City of Misha-
waka v. American Electric Power Co. (Mishawaka 11),8o for exam-
ple, the Seventh Circuit vacated a district court's injunction that
would have lowered a utility's wholesale rates to the same level as
its retail rates. The appellate court refused to apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, concluding that an antitrust violation could
justify "temporary control of the wholesale rates by [a] court."8'
7' See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1963) (al-
though primary jurisdiction does not oust the court's jurisdiction, it may sometimes result
in "channel[ing] judicial enforcement of antitrust policy into appellate review of the
agency's decision"); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 578 (1952) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) (court should not invoke primary jurisdiction since that leaves the plain-
tiff with only the remedy of the Federal Maritime Board); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 442 (1907) (when primary jurisdiction applies, the plaintiff's
independent right to maintain the action before the court is confined to such issues as can
be "redressed by courts without previous action by the Commission"); cf. Kestenbaum, Pri-
mary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the Alloca-
tion of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812, 813 (1967) (primary jurisdiction is a method by which
the court allocates "the initial power, hence often the principal power, to decide a particular
issue material to the court case").
79 The Federal Power Act provides for review by the court of appeals of any final deci-
sion by the FERC. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1982) ("Any party to a proceeding under this chap-
ter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission. . . may obtain a review of such order
in the United States court of appeals. . . ."). This power of review allows for reversal of a
FERC final order if the order is not supported by "substantial evidence." Id. Given this
statutory provision, if the district court's status after invoking primary jurisdiction is that of
a reviewing court, it also will be limited to substantial evidence review. The reviewing dis-
trict court which invoked primary jurisdiction would then be powerless to modify any rate
which met the FERC's statutory standards-even if the rate violated the antitrust laws-so
long as the FERC's determination was supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968); Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1138 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 293 (1984).
80 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
8' Id. at 991-92.
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However, because "[t]he courts should not be in the rate fixing
business," it would not award injunctive relief that would preempt
the FERC's jurisdiction. s2 In another case, a court limited its rem-
edy to an injunction prohibiting the defendant utilities from initi-
ating new anticompetitive rate structures."' The court refused to
grant damages because it thought they would disrupt the FERC's
authority to set rates based on the public interest."4
Finally, some courts have seen restrictions on agency remedies
as though they were limits on a court's power to remedy antitrust
violations. As was noted above, the FERC cannot, consistently
with the Federal Power Act and the fifth amendment, set a rate
below the "zone of reasonableness. 's5 In light of this, one court has
stated that "[e]ven the district court . . . may not have power to
set a wholesale rate below the level [at) which the FERC can set
the rate."' Likewise, one commentator has argued that a court's
power to review a FERC order does not extend to ordering the
FERC to set an unreasonable rate.8 7
82 Id. at 990.
s' City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1979).
8' Id. at 770. The Delmarva Power court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), which involved a claim that common
carriers had conspired to fix shipping rates. See Delmarva Power, 467 F. Supp. at 768. The
Court in Pennsylvania R.R. allowed an injunction against the defendant's anticompetitive
manner of initiating rates, but held that a recovery of damages would be inconsistent with
the regulatory scheme established by Congress in the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. at 455.
Pennsylvania R.R. is distinguishable from a price-squeeze case because the Interstate
Commerce Act establishes a more pervasive regulatory scheme than the Federal Power Act.
Unlike the Federal Power Act, the Interstate Commerce Act empowers the ICC to grant
reparations. 49 U.S.C. § 10,707(d)(1) (1982). While the denial of broader remedial powers to
agencies such as the FERC does not necessarily mean that the power granted was not in-
tended to be the exclusive remedy, see supra note 73 and accompanying text, the grant of
broad remedial powers which mirror a court's antitrust powers does suggest that the remedy
should be exclusive. The ICC's power thus indicates congressional intent that the repara-
tions remedy be exclusive of an antitrust court's damage remedy. Although the Delmarva
Power court recognized this distinction, it did not find it sufficiently compelling. 467 F.
Supp. at 770.
Other courts considering a price squeeze have not been troubled by the awarding of
damages in addition to injunctive relief. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671
F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1983); Mishawaka II, 616
F.2d at 986-90; Mishawaka I, 560 F.2d at 1323-24; Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania
Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1354 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
85 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
8 Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 n.2
(W.D. Pa. 1979).
87 Lopatka, supra note 6, at 600.
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IV. PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND REMEDIES: A PROPOSAL
As the preceding discussion shows, there is considerable confu-
sion among the courts regarding how a court should respond to the
jurisdictional and remedial problems associated with the dual ju-
risdiction of the FERC and the courts over price-squeeze cases. A
proper resolution of this confusion requires that courts recognize
some peculiar aspects of the price-squeeze situation. On the one
hand, antitrust courts apply substantive legal standards and reme-
dial powers that differ substantially from those of the FERC. On
the other hand, the FERC possesses institutional expertise supe-
rior to that of a court. Jurisdiction and remedial power should be
allocated between the FERC and the courts so as to further the
purposes behind each decisionmaker's powers and to maximize ac-
curacy and uniformity in their decisionmaking.
These considerations favor a limited use of the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction. A district court should defer to the superior ex-
pertise of the FERC to determine when price discrimination exists.
Yet the court should not be bound by the FERC's determination
of reasonableness since that determination is based on considera-
tions of public policy inapplicable to an antitrust claim. Nor
should the court's remedial powers be limited after the exercise of
primary jurisdiction. If an antitrust violation requires the court to
set a new rate, it need not be confined to the FERC's zone of rea-
sonableness, but should determine independently what rate is
justifiable.
A. Applying Primary Jurisdiction in Price-Squeeze Cases
There are several reasons why a district court should invoke
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to refer certain factual deter-
minations to the FERC. First, invoking the FERC's primary juris-
diction will enable courts to improve the accuracy of their deci-
sions in price-squeeze cases. A court will generally find the FERC's
expertise crucial because, "[s]imply put, a court may not be able to
determine whether a price squeeze exists without expert assis-
tance."8 8 To determine whether a wholesale rate is justifiable re-
quires complex and technical cost-of-service determinations: "The
cost of electricity . . . varies on the basis of a myriad of factors,
[which the] FERC is infinitely more adept at assessing. . . than a
court. ' 89 In this context, the FERC's expertise is essential because
Is Id. at 607 (emphasis in original).
89 Id. at 608 (footnote omitted); see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text; see also
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its determinations about price discrimination will bear directly
upon the issue of the defendant's anticompetitive intent.90 Use of
the FERC will therefore further the accurate resolution of the anti-
trust question before the court.91
Second, application of primary jurisdiction in price-squeeze
cases will also result in more uniform antitrust adjudication. The
complex factual situations of price-squeeze cases can readily lead
courts to treat similar situations differently.92 Antitrust proceed-
ings involving allegations of a price squeeze by a utility would be-
come more uniform if the existence of price discrimination-an es-
sential part of an antitrust allegation-were determined in a
standardized manner by a single, expert body.
Moreover, courts have misunderstood the nature of primary
jurisdiction insofar as they think limits on the FERC's powers re-
duce their ability to refer to the FERC particular factual determi-
nations relevant to the antitrust case. 3 Primary jurisdiction serves
only to allocate jurisdictional priority; a court invoking primary ju-
risdiction retains complete jurisdiction over the case at hand and
should accept, subject to review for error, the findings of the ad-
ministrative agency only on those issues which it has asked the
agency to decide.9 4 The scope of the jurisdiction the court retains
will therefore depend on the nature of the issue it referred to the
City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 769 (D. Del. 1979) (stat-
ing that the Federal Power Act contemplates the FERC's "expert eye" to oversee wholesale
rates).
90 See, e.g., Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343,
1351 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
" The emphasis placed on administrative expertise here is not contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976), that primary jurisdic-
tion should not be invoked if the administrative expertise applies to a wholly separate issue,
id. at 305-06. In Nader, an action against an airline for fraudulent misrepresentation and
overbooking of flights did not fall under the CAB's primary jurisdiction because its statu-
tory power to abate deceptive practices was not synonymous with power over common law
fraud and misrepresentation. The issue in Nader, unlike the price discrimination issue, was
not one in which an accurate decision "could be facilitated by an informed evaluation of the
economics or technology of the regulated industry." Id. at 305; cf. Note, The Applicability
of Antitrust Laws to Price Squeezes in the Electric Utility Industry, 54 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
103, 125 (1979) (arguing that the FERC has no special expertise which is relevant to deter-
mining whether a rate is appropriate under the antitrust laws).
92 See, e.g., City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 934 (2d Cir.
1981) (construing a utility's wholesale rate as creating a price squeeze), rev'g City of Groton
v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 497 F. Supp. 1040, 1055-57 (D. Conn. 1980) (construing
defendant's action as nonmonopolistic).
" See Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1351
(W.D. Pa. 1979) ("The inadequacy of agency remedial powers does not preclude the applica-
tion of primary jurisdiction in an antitrust action.").
9 See 16e J. VON KALINOwSim, supra note 55, § 44A.03[1].
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administrative agency for decision. If the court invokes primary ju-
risdiction for the sole purpose of obtaining a specific factual deter-
mination from the agency, it need only accept those findings re-
gardless of the outcome of the agency proceeding. The court may
retain jurisdiction to provide any justified antitrust remedy even if
it is unavailable to the FERC.
Given these advantages, it is unclear why some courts have
resisted using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in price-squeeze
cases. While courts have emphasized the differences between the
legal standards and remedies relevant to a price squeeze in the reg-
ulatory and antitrust contexts, they largely have ignored an impor-
tant similarity: the determination of price discrimination. As this
determination is the first step in both contexts, the courts should
seek to take advantage of the FERC's expertise on that issue.
The primary jurisdiction of the FERC should thus be invoked
in price-squeeze cases within the following guidelines. When an an-
titrust challenge to a price squeeze is filed, the court should defer
to the FERC for a period of time long enough to allow the FERC
to initiate (if necessary) and complete its proceedings. That period
should not, however, be so long as to allow severe financial injury
to the plaintiff.9 5 When FERC proceedings are complete, the anti-
trust court should accept the FERC's findings about price discrim-
ination, subject only to "substantial evidence" review. Those find-
ings may also be used by the court in evaluating the defendant's
intent. However, a court should not be bound by the FERC's de-
termination as to whether a rate is "unduly discriminatory" be-
cause the FERC's determination of reasonableness may be affected
by consideration of countervailing public policies that are foreign
to the court's antitrust inquiry.
B. A Court's Remedial Powers
1. Primary Jurisdiction and Remedial Powers. Judging from
the various limitations that courts have imposed on their remedial
5 It may take the FERC years to complete its proceedings. See, e.g., Cities of Bethany
v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir.) (3 years), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 293 (1984);
Kansas Cities v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (2-1/2 years); Mishawaka I, 560
F.2d at 1316-17 (3 years). Because some small utilities might be virtually destroyed by the
financial drain of a price squeeze continuing that long, antitrust relief should be available if
the FERC proceedings extend beyond the plaintiff's ability to endure. This approach was
adopted in Monsanto Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line, Co., 360 F. Supp. 1054 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd, 489 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There the court recognized that a delay could be mate-
rially harmful to the plaintiff and decreed that if FPC hearings were not completed by an
established date, the antitrust suit would resume. Id. at 1057.
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powers in price-squeeze cases, invoking primary jurisdiction is ap-
parently thought to restrict-a court's ability to exercise those pow-
ers.96 Some courts limit their remedial powers to correspond with
the limits upon the FERC's powers. Others conclude that they
must uphold a finding of the agency unless it is not supported by
substantial evidence.97 Still other courts deem themselves bound
by the FERC's determination of what constitutes a confiscatory
rate and will not exert their powers to lower the utility's rate below
the lower bound of the zone of reasonableness. 8
Under the approach to primary jurisdiction just outlined, how-
ever, a court's power to remedy antitrust violations is not im-
paired. A court can invoke primary jurisdiction simply to take ad-
vantage of the FERC's expertise in determining the existence of
price discrimination, and need not inquire whether the FERC
deems the rates to be reasonable. Accordingly, in deciding whether
the antitrust laws were violated the court would be bound by the
FERC's determinations as to price discrimination. It would only be
free to reject those findings through its power of review. The
broader question of whether the antitrust laws have been violated,
however, is wholly distinct from whether the FERC deemed a
wholesale rate to be reasonable in light of countervailing policy
considerations. Thus, if the court limits its deferral to the primary
jurisdiction of the FERC to a determination of price discrimina-
tion, the FERC's decisions as to other matters do not limit the
court's power to remedy an antitrust violation if it finds one.9
In addition, referring a case to the FERC only for a determi-
nation of price discrimination will enable a court to enforce the
antitrust laws without directly interfering in the regulatory author-
ity of the FERC. A proposed wholesale rate may be reasonable
" See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
" Compare, e.g., cases cited supra note 77 with cases cited supra note 78.
"s See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
'9 The only court considering an antitrust challenge to a price squeeze that has ex-
pressly ruled on the scope of its review after invoking primary jurisdiction held that its
powers were unchanged. Borough of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 570 F. Supp.
553, 559-60 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
It is apparent that other courts considering primary jurisdiction in price-squeeze cases
have also assumed, without clarifying their reasoning, that their ability to decide the anti-
trust issue is unaffected by FERC's primary jurisdiction. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v.
Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982); City of Batavia v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., No. 76-C-4388 (N.D. IMI., Jan. 16, 1984) (available Nov. 20, 1985, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (a court can "merely note" the FERC's determination as "indepen-
dent confirmation" of facts also produced in the district court); cf. Borough of Ellwood City
v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (noting that a FERC
reasonableness finding "could be determinative of elements of the antitrust claim").
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under the FERC's standards yet still violate the antitrust laws. A
court's exercise of its remedial powers after referral is only an ini-
tial application of the antitrust laws, not a reevaluation of the
FERC's determination of the rate's reasonableness. At most the
court might prohibit a utility from charging a FERC-approved rate
or order a defendant to file a lower wholesale rate; but this would
not change the way in which the FERC sets rates according to cri-
teria unrelated to the antitrust issue.100 While the court's action
would change the actual rate set by the FERC, this would only
incidentally affect the FERC's overall approach to energy policy.
Since a court's exercise of its remedial powers after invoking pri-
mary jurisdiction would interfere with the FERC's authority only
to the extent necessary to enforce the antitrust laws, these reme-
dial powers should not be presumed to be repealed.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States,101 some tension between the courts and the FERC
is inevitable.10 2 Yet this tension can be eased by applying the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction in a way that accommodates the
FERC's expertise without eviscerating enforcement of the antitrust
laws. As a general rule of statutory construction, "[w]hen there are
two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if
possible."' 0 3 This is particularly important where, as in the conflict
between the antitrust laws and the Federal Power Act, the two
statutes have different goals. Recognizing this, the primary juris-
diction approach suggested here helps to give effect to both stat-
utes, while at the same time increasing the accuracy and uniform-
ity of factual determinations in price-squeeze cases.
2. The Zone of Reasonableness and Remedial Powers. After
the court has invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
FERC may refuse to set a wholesale rate low enough to eliminate
what it has found to be undue price discrimination because it
deems the necessary rate to be constitutionally confiscatory and
thus outside the zone of reasonableness. Some courts and commen-
tators have suggested that, whatever the binding nature of the
FERC's other determinations, this decision would bind the court
in a price-squeeze case.'04 According to this view, whether a utility
zoo See, e.g., Mishawaka I, 560 F.2d at 1323 (the court's ordering of defendant to file
new wholesale rates after antitrust violation was found not to interfere with the FPC).
20z 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
102 Id. at 373-74.
103 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
'0 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
19851 1115
1116 The University of Chicago Law Review [52:1090
will earn a reasonable return at a particular rate is a question of
fact within the statutory expertise of the FERC; if courts were to
set wholesale rates below the FERC's zone of reasonableness it
would disrupt the entire FERC rate-setting process. 0 5
This analysis is incorrect because it misunderstands the flexi-
ble nature of primary jurisdiction and the autonomy of the courts'
antitrust jurisdiction in the price-squeeze context. Limited referral
of a price-squeeze case to the FERC simply will have no effect on
the court's power to remedy antitrust violations. If the court turns
to the FERC only for a factual determination of the existence of
price discrimination, it is not bound by the rate approved or set by
the FERC. The countervailing policy considerations which may
lead the FERC to find some prices not unduly discriminatory may
also affect its determination of which rates are confiscatory. These
policy judgments are foreign to the antitrust laws. The court need
not exercise primary jurisdiction in order to receive such findings,
so it is not bound by them. In addition, the court, unlike the
FERC, is not constrained to setting rates within the zone of rea-
sonableness; the court may order rates below that zone if necessary
to eliminate the antitrust violation. Thus, when the court finds an
illegal price squeeze after the FERC's factual determination, its re-
medial powers are not affected by the FERC's finding that a par-
ticular rate is confiscatory.106
'o5 See Lopatka, supra note 6, at 600.
106 A district court also is not limited in its power to review a FERC determination that
a certain rate is confiscatory. Federal courts are not bound by an agency's determination
with regard to facts necessary to the adjudication of constitutional rights. See St. Joseph
Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
56-57, 64 (1932) (separate review by the courts preserves the judiciary's role as an indepen-
dent arbiter of constitutional questions); cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442, 450
n.7 (1977) (in determining private rights, "fact finding by an administrative agency [is] only
as an adjunct to an Art. HI court"). The determination of what constitutes a confiscatory
rate is such a question. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. One who challenges
the constitutionality of a wholesale rate is entitled to a "fair opportunity to [submit his
case] to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both
law and facts." Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
While this doctrine has been applied to set aside rates that an agency has found not to be
confiscatory, see, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 401 (1938);
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 695
(1923), it also means that a court cannot be bound by an agency determination that confis-
cation has occurred. This is not to say, however, that the courts' power to review constitu-
tional facts de novo requires attaching no weight to the agency's determination. The deter-
mination of what is confiscatory will often rest on primary findings of fact within the
FERC's area of expertise. See FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942)
(courts will not interfere without "clear showing" that agency has incorrectly set confisca-
tory rate); St. Joseph Stock Yard, 298 U.S. at 53-54 (only a "clear case" justifies setting
aside an agency determination of confiscation).
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Nor are there prudential reasons for the court to refrain from
setting rates below the zone of reasonableness. After invoking pri-
mary jurisdiction, the court will become involved in rate-setting
only to the extent necessary to remedy the antitrust violation, by
such means as ordering the defendant to file a lower rate or
prohibiting the filing of a higher rate. The court would not order
the FERC itself to violate its directive by setting what it views as
an unreasonable rate or dictate to the agency the policies it should
follow in setting wholesale power rates. The court's response to an
antitrust violation therefore would not involve undue interference
with the FERC's procedures and policies, despite its effect on the
outcome of the rate-setting process.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts have differing views of their role in an antitrust
challenge to an alleged price squeeze among competing utility com-
panies. They disagree about the extent to which the FERC's con-
current authority over price-squeeze cases affects both a court's ju-
risdiction over an antitrust case and its powers to remedy
violations of the antitrust laws. Proper allocation of jurisdiction
between the court and the agency is extremely important in price-
squeeze cases because it can affect the accuracy and uniformity of
the court's factual findings, particularly if the court can draw upon
the FERC's technical expertise on certain issues which are essen-
tial to the court's antitrust inquiry. And, proper application of the
court's remedial powers is central to ensuring enforcement of the
antitrust laws without interfering unduly with the FERC's regula-
tory role in the electric power industry.
To satisfy both of these concerns, this comment suggests that
a court use the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in price-squeeze
cases to refer to the FERC the factual determination of the exis-
tence of price discrimination. After this referral, courts need only
accept as binding the FERC's findings with regard to price dis-
crimination. The FERC's determination of whether a wholesale
rate is unduly discriminatory, unreasonable, or confiscatory need
not be followed by the court. This leaves the court free to consider
on its own any other issues relating to the alleged antitrust viola-
tion and to remedy any violation by using the full scope of its re-
medial powers. Such a scheme will further the substantive pur-
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poses of both the Federal Power Act and the antitrust laws while
improving uniformity and accuracy in the determination of
whether price discrimination exists.
Andrew G. Humphrey
